RESPONSE TO STATEMENTS BY RADAN NIKOLIC, PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF WAR VETERANS SINCE 1990: NIKOLIC IS STILL AT WAR WITH THE VICTIMS AND THE TRUTH
02/11/2024PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE CHAIR TO ADDRESS JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND PROSECUTORIAL COUNCIL VACANCIES
11/11/2024MONTENEGRO’S CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AT 60: CHALLENGES TO INTEGRITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND EFFICIENCY
Human Rights Action (HRA) and the Center for Democratic Transition (CDT) express concern that the Constitutional Court—celebrating its 60th anniversary—is not operating as a transparent institution and fails to uphold its integrity.
In a letter addressed to the President of the Constitutional Court, Snežana Armenko, HRA and CDT proposed that the court commemorate its six decades of existence by publicly announcing the timeline and order in which it plans to address the backlog of over 2,000 constitutional complaints and more than 300 initiatives for constitutional review. They emphasize that the court’s integrity is compromised, particularly as two of its six judges are functioning in violation of the Constitution of Montenegro, and neither the Assembly nor the President of the state has been duly informed—a violation of the law.
For years, both international and domestic organizations have criticized the lack of transparency and the insular nature of the Constitutional Court, especially concerning the handling of electoral complaints.
Unfortunately, these criticisms have yet to result in meaningful changes. The court does not publish the dates of its sessions, nor does it disclose the order in which it intends to address cases within its jurisdiction. Additionally, it does not clarify which cases take precedence and the rationale behind such decisions.
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has repeatedly underscored the need for improved transparency in resolving electoral disputes. This includes establishing a public registry for complaints and organizing public hearings so that all parties can present their arguments. ODIHR further stresses that the Constitutional Court should be mandated to publish all electoral complaints and decisions on its website and promptly inform the involved parties.
Regrettably, rather than adopt these essential recommendations, the Constitutional Court has introduced yet another detrimental practice. Instead of forwarding electoral complaints to the State Election Commission (SEC) for an expedited response, as has been customary, the court now delays this process by days or even weeks, interpreting the law in a way that contradicts its intended purpose. The tight deadlines for resolving electoral complaints are designed to uphold electoral rights; the law’s intent is clear—complaints should be forwarded to the SEC swiftly to allow for timely responses, with a 24-hour timeframe for SEC replies and a 48-hour deadline for the Constitutional Court’s decisions. During this period, the public lacks official information regarding the number of complaints received. Such delays represent a significant threat to the protection of electoral rights.
A serious question arises regarding the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court as an institution grounded in the Constitution and the law. Two of its six judges have reached the age of retirement as mandated by the Law on Pension and Disability Insurance, which should have prompted the termination of their mandates in accordance with the Constitution (Article 154, Paragraph 1). A third judge is set to meet these requirements in December. Despite this, both judges continue to serve, and the relevant bodies responsible for proposing new candidates have not been informed of this situation.
Significantly, the proposing bodies are required to be notified six months prior to the conclusion of a judge’s mandate; however, the Constitutional Court has failed to inform either the Assembly or the President of the state. Instead, during a session held in June, the judges of the Court voted on when their mandates should end, with a majority (4:2) deciding to remain in office until the mandatory retirement age set by the Labor Law, rather than resigning in accordance with the Constitution of Montenegro, which stipulates that judges must vacate their positions upon meeting the age requirements for retirement as outlined in the Law on Pension and Disability Insurance.
A particularly concerning aspect of this situation is that the two judges directly impacted were not recused from the decision-making process; instead, they participated in deciding “their own case,” creating a clear conflict of interest regarding when their mandates should conclude. This scenario contravenes the principle of *nemo iudex in causa sua* (no one should be a judge in their own case), which is binding even on the Constitutional Court of Montenegro under the current Law on the Constitutional Court.
Meanwhile, for all other judges in Montenegro’s regular courts, mandates conclude in accordance with the same constitutional provision—“upon meeting the age requirements for retirement,” as defined by the Law on Pension and Disability Insurance. However, only certain judges of the Constitutional Court have insisted on extending their terms beyond this point, leveraging the situation to solidify their rulings as a general rule.
To illustrate, if Judge Budimir Šćepanović, who turned 65 in May, and Judge Desanka Lopičić, who became eligible for retirement after 40 years of service, were judges of, say, the Supreme Court of Montenegro, their mandates would have been concluded long ago, and they would certainly not be presiding or hosting guests at the anniversary celebration of the Constitutional Court.
We remind the public and responsible state authorities that a fundamental requirement for Montenegro’s accession to the European Union is the existence of institutions capable of upholding the rule of law. In its current state, the Constitutional Court falls short of being one of those institutions.
Tea Gorjanc Prelević, Executive Director of the NGO Human Rights Action
Milica Kovačević, Program Director of the NGO Center for Democratic Transition